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The digital political communication de-
veloped by terrorists, analysing two ca-
ses, al-Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria (ISIS), is the main focus of 
this article. It is, concretely, explored, in 
the context of communication strategy, 
the use of social networks, in terms of 
the message evoked by these terrorist 
groups of modern times. 
Being an applied study with empirical 
techniques, such as content analysis 
and semiotic analysis, the major aim 
is founded, generally, in deconstructing 
and reconstructing the social networks 
communication strategies (objectives, 
means, message, target audience) of 
the terrorist groups and, deeply, in scru-
tinizing the content and form of messa-
ge. The data collection comprises politi-
cal messages of the terrorist groups in a 
digital approach. To theoretically enrich 
the investigation, it is adopted the fra-
mework of uses and gratifications. 
El focus principal d’aquest article analit-
za la comunicació política digital desen-
volupada per dos grups terroristes: al-
Qaeda i l’Estat Islàmic de l’Iraq i Síria 
(ISIS). L’anàlisi s’ha realitzat en el con-
text de les estratègies de comunicació, 
centrant-se en l’ús de les xarxes socials 
a partir dels missatges avui emesos pels 
dos grups terroristes. 
En tractar-se d’un estudi realitzat amb 
tècniques empíriques, com ara l’anàlisi 
de contingut i l’anàlisi semiòtic, l’objectiu 
general es fonamenta en la deconstrucció 
i reconstrucció de les estratègies de comu-
nicació dels grups terroristes dintre de les 
xarxes socials (objectius, mitjans, missat-
ge, públic objectiu) i molt específicament 
en l’anàlisi dels continguts i les formes 
dels missatges. La compilació de dades 
inclou els missatges polítics dels grups 
terroristes en el context digital. A més, la 
investigació també remet a la teoria de 
comunicació dels “usos i recompenses”.
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14 Results highlight that, thematically, 
“context codes” and “communication 
tools” are the most present in tweets 
related to both groups. Other issues 
expose the intention to build a bellige-
rent and warmongering ambience. Pro-
pagandistically, “strength mood” and 
“dissuasion” are salient, suggesting an 
image of dominance. “Holy war” as the 
major claim in tweets corroborates the 
ideological frame: the alliance between 
religion and belligerence. The videos 
analysed broadly convey counterpropa-
ganda (inter and extra terrorist groups) 
and instigation to war, but not much 
claims (one in five videos), and are ba-
sed on form techniques. 
Key words: cyberterrorism,1 digital po-
litical communication strategy, social 
networks, al-Qaeda, ISIS.
Els resultats destaquen els “codis de 
context” i les “eines de comunicació” 
com els temes més presents en els tuits 
relacionats amb els dos grups terroris-
tes. Altres qüestions exposen la intenció 
de crear un clima agressiu i prebèl·lic. 
Propagandísticament, “esperit fort ” i 
“dissuasió” són molt rellevants i susci-
ten una idea de poder. “Guerra santa”, 
com a principal reclam dels tuits, re-
força el marc ideològic: l’aliança entre 
religió i lluita. Els vídeos analitzats, rea-
litzats amb tècniques simples, difonen 
a tot el món contrapropaganda interna 
i externa i fan una crida a la guerra, 
però només un entre cinc resulta reivin-
dicatiu.
Paraules clau: ciberterrorisme, estratè-
gia de comunicació política digital, xar-
xes socials, al-Qaeda, ISIS.
Terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), are emerging as political actors in the climax of the use of digital media and as an effect of the abundance of channels and connections between 
actors and citizens, of the exploration of symbols and of an anti-cultural para-
digm in politics. These channels and symbols are also used to recruit men and 
women disposed to die and kill in the name of a cause. 
These organizations politicise the religious issues in a transnational and 
hybrid public sphere and use the mediatisation of politics, i.e., the media to 
expand their political communication and to convince a maximum of citi-
zens. Namely the social media/networks and digital strategy play a key role in 
the global dissemination of propaganda, radicalization, and recruitment (e.g. 
Chatfield, Reddick and Brajawidagda, 2015: 3). Today, social media companies 
and private dot com domains are the ones providing the digital megaphone 
to al-Qaeda and extremists (Harris, 2015). With no mainstream media channel 
through which to communicate, ISIS uses extreme acts of violence in order to 
attract global attention online. With ISIS seeking extra recruits and internatio-
nal visibility, these challenges leave the group strongly dependent on the use 
of mainstream social media platforms, like Twitter and YouTube (Khatib, 2014). 
With this option, al-Qaeda has ceased to be dependent on Western journalists 
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to spread its message, managing to transmit and spread its message without 
journalistic editing or censorship (Byman 2015). Additionally, Conway and 
Mclnerney (2008) suggest evidence to a YouTube user to support the potential 
for online radicalisation. 
Our proposal aims, in general terms, to address the digital media communica-
tion developed internationally by terrorist groups. The starting question is: how 
do terrorist groups, al-Qaeda and ISIS, use social networks to communicate politically? 
In this logic, the general objective is to understand and analyse how terrorist 
groups, specifically al-Qaeda and ISIS, use social networks to communicate poli-
tically.
We define the following specific objectives: (1) to analyse the political message 
and claims present in digital networks and, by inference, to perceive the uses and 
gratifications that anchor the relation between digital media and terrorists; and 
(2) to identify and to compare the digital communication strategies (in terms 
of objectives/uses, means —social networks—, message —content and form—, 
and target audience) of both groups in study. These objectives respond to the 
challenge launched by Dawson (2000: 25) of examining the influence of the In-
ternet on identity formation and the potential to establish virtual communities. 
Empirically, we identify and measure variables of content and form of propagan-
da message, inferring on the specificities of identity and virtual community that 
are been constructed and on the type and purposes of digital communication. 
In sum, “what, with regard to religion [in this case, Islamic terrorism], is on the 
Internet, and who is using it, how and why” (Dawson, 2000: 26).
“After 9/11, the world was never the same” (Castro, 2015). Although respon-
sible for the attack that marked the beginning of the century, al-Qaeda has been 
losing its role in the international scene and is being gradually replaced by ISIS 
(Louro, 2015), which was considered the terrorist group accountable for more 
terrorist attacks in 2015 (START, 2016: 3). For purposes of analysis, both groups 
were admitted for comparison in order to demonstrate the major similarities and 
differences in their digital political communication strategies.
This research is based, mainly, on qualitative method. The techniques that we 
intend to use are bibliographic and documentary research, content analysis, and 
semiotic analysis. We analyse political messages of terrorist groups in online plat-
forms (Twitter and YouTube) in order to identify the communication strategies 
used and to perceive how they (are used and) contribute to build a symbolic and 
compelling image. It is also intended to conduct a semiotic analysis of videos 
published by groups, in an effort to discover the codification techniques applied 
and the latent meanings. The analysis of the political communication of these 
type of groups can help policy makers, intelligence analysts, researchers and so-
ciety in general better perceive the groups’ campaigns and modus operandi and 
help suggest counterpropaganda and counter intelligence strategies and military 
plans. 
Our article tries to articulate and link aspects related to new political actors 
(terrorists), to communicative forms, to political content, to political processes 
(e.g. persuasion, recruitment) and to digital mediation of politics (digital net-
works, as Twitter and YouTube).
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16 ISLAMIC TERRORISM AND POLITICAL COMMUNICATION:  
A LITERATURE REVIEW
The issues of terrorism and the use of the media have been widely debated, espe-
cially after 9/11 attacks, in which terrorism has acquired international visibility, 
getting on the agenda of the international media.
In general terms, stressing the importance of communication, including how 
terrorist organizations use the Internet to reach and achieve their goals, we list 
the study of Delgado (2013). About digital operations by terrorists, we find, for 
example, the studies of Mahmoud (2013) and Morrison (2011). 
On each terrorist group individually, Pinto (2015) discusses the origins, 
methods of actuation and recruitment and forms of propaganda2 of ISIS. In an 
embracing study, Farwell (2014) addresses the messages of ISIS, both online and 
offline (e.g. traditional media). About the videos from ISIS, it can be referred 
the study of Salem, Reid and Chen (2006). The violent attack video is the most 
frequently identified (eighteen videos out of twenty) (2006: 618). The remai-
ning are leader messages (2006: 618). Belim (2012) and Webber (2014) show the 
results of a content analysis to some of digitally broadcast communications of 
al-Qaeda’s leadership, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri. The corpus, in the first study, is 
the speeches and, in the second, video and audio propaganda.
On social media and digital platforms, the study of Chatfield, Reddick and 
Brajawidagda (2015) finds strong evidence for Shamiwitness-intermediated 
multi-sided Twitter networks of international mass media, regional Arabic mass 
media, ISIS fighters, and ISIS sympathizers, supporting the framework’s utility. 
O’Neil and Gray (2011) offer an expositive article on Islamic terror networks 
implementation of network technologies, scrutinizing the three communication 
strategic functions: (1) to legitimize their movement; (2) to propagate visions 
and slogans to targeted audiences; and (3) to intimidate their opponents (2011: 
44-46). Using social network analysis, Klausen et al., (2012) show that, behind 
the apparent proliferation of such sources, YouTube account holders associated 
with incarnations of the British al-Muhajiroun collude to post propaganda and 
violent content. In the study of Mosemghvdlishvili and Jansz (2012), the com-
monest category present in YouTube videos is educating/preaching Islam (2012: 
488), and motivation to “create” is the most referred (2012: 493). Blaker (2015) 
refers to “a pervasive social media campaign” of ISIS.
Comparing both groups under study and respective communication strate-
gies,3 we can indicate Berger (2014), Byman (2015), Fink and Sugg (2015), and 
Stalinsky and Sosnow (2014). Some of these refer the analysis of news content 
on terrorists (e.g. Abdullah and Elareshi, 2015; Faria, 2007; Yusof et al., 2013) and 
their messages and media strategies, namely al-Qaeda (e.g. Lynch 2006; Weins-
tein, Frazier and Bongar 2009). Faria (2007), for example, exploring the media 
aspect, analyses terrorist acts as media phenomena and reflects on how media co-
verage of such events should be outlined, so that “the media are not used as mere 
platforms of dissemination of objectives of terrorist organizations” (2007: 155).
In conclusion of a possible literature review, there is a preponderance of lite-
rature on al-Qaeda as a terrorist group —perhaps because ISIS is more recent—, 
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on the media impact of 9/11 and on the use of the Internet and social networks. 
But there is a limited systematic research on social media used by Islamic terro-
rism networks in supporting terrorism communication. And it is observed a lack 
of studies comparing the two groups in a communicational dimension. So, we 
propose to bridge these two theoretical gaps. Overall, many studies mentioned 
above tend to the exclusive support in bibliographic or documental research and 
not in analytical techniques typical of applied studies, such as content analy-
sis or semiotic analysis. Hence, to fill this methodological gap, we adopt these 
techniques.
THE USES AND GRATIFICATIONS THEORY (UGT)
Opposing the traditional theory of the effects of media communication, the star-
ting point of the UGT is the activism and the use of media to meet certain needs 
of the subject (Katz and Rice, 2002). Instead of focusing on the question: What 
do the media do with individuals? This theory concentrates on the question: What 
do individuals do with the media?
This framework is particularly profitable for studies of the Internet due to the 
tendency of people to use the Internet in a more instrumental and utilitarian 
way and less as sheer habit, in comparison to the use of classical and other me-
dia. Interactivity, the fundamental feature of digital media, corroborates the idea 
of active users (e.g. Riezu, 2014: 31). 
The UGT has not paid much attention to the relationship between media and 
Islamic religion/followers or between media and Islamic terrorists or between 
Islamic media and people in general. Some studies anchors in this theory (e.g. 
Almenayes, 2014; Auter and Elkarhili, 2014; Ho, Lee and Hameed, 2008; Mahadi, 
2013; Mosemghvdlishvili and Jansz, 2012; Sands, 2010).
Some conclusions can be expressed: (1) Arab and Muslim-oriented Facebook 
pages are consumed for “relaxation” and, when Facebook is used for culturally or 
religiously specific purposes, it was found to be associated with the importance 
of group membership (membership self esteem) (Auter and Elkarhili, 2014); (2) 
In the thematic frame of Internet consumption among Muslims, the Internet has 
invited some Muslims into alternative forms of engaging and identifying them-
selves (Sands, 2010); (3) The online religious engagement is strongly correlated to 
both personal religious concerns and traditional religious activities (Ho, Lee and 
Hameed, 2008); (4) The majority of the Malaysian Muslim students use online Isla-
mic informative media to seek answers and the second more expressive amount of 
Malaysia Muslim students seek in-person support (Mahadi, 2013: 34); (5) Religio-
sity is negatively related to viewing social media as an alternative to face-to-face 
interaction, feelings of self-confidence, panic (Almenayes, 2014); (6) YouTube 
user-created videos about Islam is motivated to “create” (Mosemghvdlishvili and 
Jansz, 2012: 493). 
Without referring explicitly this theoretical framework, some authors (e.g. 
Blaker, 2015; Bonzio, 2014; Faria, 2007; O’Neil and Gray, 2011) conceive con-
tents on terrorist communication’s functions that can be integrated in. For exam-
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18 ple, Bonzio (2014) refers that Twitter is being used to launch threats, to challenge 
claims to the enemy, to vaunt his own actions and Katz and Raisman (2014) to 
contact in an easy and instant way a huge audience with millions of users.
‘IT’S THE DIGITAL STRATEGY, STUPID’ 
Both groups use the media with strategic objectives: (1) to spread fear among the 
target audience, (2) to frustrate and disrupt the response of governments and secu-
rity forces, and (3) to mobilize, encourage and attract their supporters and potential 
supporters to the cause. The recruitment of new members will permit deriving more 
financial funds and creating conditions for more possible attacks (Faria, 2007: 159).
Since 2008, al-Qaeda is growing its online offensive (Whitlock, 2008). And 
since 2013, Twitter is the main propaganda tool of al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda and many 
of its affiliates have coming to take advantage of the potential offered by Twitter 
(Katz and Raisman, 2014).
In Twitter, ISIS’s strategy is to publish the same content multiple times, ac-
companied by the hashtags of the moment —with the view to reach as many 
people as possible (Pinto, 2015: 105-106)—. In addition to the constant flow of 
images for the purpose of shocking and intimidating, ISIS systematically shares 
hundreds of inspiring images, skilfully worked in Photoshop. Often, users not as-
sociated with the group contribute individually with the conception and trans-
lation of support messages (Aibaili, 2014). The most used hashtags refer to the 
“Islamic State”, followed by “account suspended” and “Syria” (Santos, 2015).
ISIS’s videos are used for recruitment and propaganda (Franco, Moleiro and 
Guerreiro, 2015) and documentaries seek to glorify the deeds of the fighters. It 
is the case of mujatweets —short videos posted on YouTube that show the ISIS 
militants in noble activities, like visiting a wounded combatant in the hospital 
or distributing sweets to children (Bonzio, 2014)— or the documentary Flames of 
War (Pinto, 2015: 106).
The main advantage of digital tools is the multiplier effect through the perso-
nal contacts that seems to be more effective than the general broadcast of tradi-
tional media (e.g. press, radio, TV). 
Thus, cyberspace is the backdrop of both internal and external communi-
cation of the two groups, creating conditions for the tactical development and 
military indoctrination. 
METHOD AND DATA
This study is based on qualitative method. The techniques used are bibliogra-
phical research, documentary research, content analysis, and semiotic analysis.
Knowing that formal communication aspects are considered indicators of cog-
nitive activity of the communicator, of social and political meanings of speech 
or of the social use that the actor makes of communication (Quivy and Campen-
houdt, 2005: 259), the content analysis will focus on the digital media messages 
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of terrorist organizations. In this effort, we intend to analyse the materials most 
diffused in the media and most visualized in the Internet, attempting to optimize 
the all revealing potential of the political communication of the both groups.
The analysis period begins on 29 June 2014 —the date of the ISIS self-pro-
clamation— and extends to 31 March 2016 —the starting date of the present 
analysis— which empowers to compare the two groups in a co-existence context. 
Although al-Qaeda less visible actually on the international scene, the group re-
fuses to be declining (e.g. Malsin, 2015). And although ISIS has managed to over-
shadow its ideological predecessor in the media, ISIS and al-Qaeda have become 
more powerful in recent years, conquering more allies (e.g. Bayoumy, Browning 
and Ghobari, 2016; Anon, 2014).
The content analysis to the propagandistic component is applied to videos, 
and messages of the following Twitter accounts: @Terror_Monitor, @Track_Terro-
rism and @memrijttm. These accounts were chosen because of editorial policy 
adopted, reflected in the type of content exposed: more associated to informa-
tion of terrorist propaganda —and, hence, representative of this object of stu-
dy— and not compromisingly to any terrorist group or media. The tweets were 
selected using the keywords “alqaeda”, “AQAM” [Al Qaeda and Associated Move-
ments] and “AQIM” [al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb] and, on the other hand, 
“ISIS”, “islamicstate” and “IS”. The corpus is formed with sixteen tweets from @
Track_Terrorism, 40 from @Terror_Monitor and 34 from @memrijttm. The initial 
idea was to analyse accounts of the terrorist groups, but it was not possible due 
to their constant elimination by Twitter itself. 
The choice of the videos (see Table 1) meets criteria, such as the online avai-
lability, the most viewed videos on YouTube and the largest number of shares in 
social networks. 
The analysis categories for terrorist communication are, in the case of Twitter 
and videos and in the content dimension, the theme/issue (starting from Webber 
coding), the rules of political propaganda (e.g. Domenach, 1962/n.d.; Gonçalves, 
1961, 2001) and the type of claim. In the form dimension, the type of image (see 
Table 2).
Table 1. Video corpus
ISIS Al-Qaeda
- Teaser flames of war – <https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=PXebfSWoCOg>
- New propaganda video showing aftermath of army 
attack on refugee camp –
<http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/al-
qaeda-release-new-propaganda-7286623>
- Lend me your ears – <https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=Vcew3qmidRI>
- Lucas Kinney video propaganda – <https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=dD5UVqmNJqw>
- Mujatweet –
<http://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/
social-media-fight-between-us-and-isis-weirder-youd-
imagine-180952663/?no-ist>
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20 Table 2. Codification to the terrorist communication in videos and Twitter
Content analysis to videos and Twitter’s accounts:
@memrijttm, @terror_monitor e @track_terrorism;
Dimension Content/substance Form/expression
Category Theme/issue Propaganda’s rules Type of claim Type of image
Indicator - Audience segmentation;
- Claim of responsibility for 
the attacks;
- Call to jihad;
- Communication tools;
- Context codes;
- Counterpropaganda;
- Death of jihadists;
- Establishment of 
the validity of the 
communicator;
- Executions;
- Extra-group;
- Intimidation and threat of 
attack;
- Intra-group;
- Justification of violence;
- Medical assistance and 
jihadists recovery;
- Preparation of the jihadists;
- Public punishment for anti-
Islam acts;
- Sequestrations and 
hostages;
- Show of victory;
- Stylistic elements;
- Types and effects of war 
action;
- Bases of propaganda;
- Counterpropaganda;
- Style;
- Strength image;
- Impossibility of 
identification;
- Holy war;
- Release of 
terrorists;
- Withdrawal 
of Western 
troops from 
terrorist 
territory;
- No claim;
- Text;
- Text and image;
- Text and video;
- Text, image and 
video.
Source: Adapted from Weber, 2014; Domenach, 1962/n.d.; Gonçalves, 1961, 2001. Own elaboration.
In general, the units of analysis to the propagandistic content are the item, the 
word, and the theme. 
It was intended to also conduct a semiotic analysis of videos, in order to 
discover the codification techniques applied and to discover latent meanings. 
The categories of semiotic analysis are, in the linguistic level, the etymology 
of emphasized words and the poetic function; in the iconic-plastic level, the 
plastic signifiers pointed out by Joly (2007), such as the frame, the colour, and 
the angle.
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RESULTS
The presentation of results is structured according to the objectives that this re-
search aims to respond. 
1) Political Message and Claims
a) Twitter
Theme
The analysis to Twitter (see Figure 1) concludes that the most common theme/
topic, in all the three profiles and concerning about the both groups analysed, 
is the “context codes” —with 35 on al-Qaeda and 36 on ISIS— and the second 
is “communication tools” —with thirteen tweets on al-Qaeda and eighteen on 
ISIS—, referring, for example, to applications for phones, hashtags, magazines, 
Twitter or propaganda videos.
On al-Qaeda, topics “types and effects of war action” (referring to attacks, 
destruction and fire to buildings, victims of attacks, mass executions, suicide 
bombers, destruction of churches and monuments), “death of jihadists” and “in-
timidation and threat of attack” —each with six tweets— followed the two most 
expressive ones.
In the case of ISIS, the two most salient topics are proceeded by topics: “claim 
of responsibility for the attacks” (eleven tweets), “public punishment for anti-
Islam acts” (for reasons, such as homosexuality, alcohol and drug consumption 
and insults to Allah, apostates) (seven tweets) and “intimidation and threat of 
attack” (six tweets).
Figure 1. Most expressive themes present in Twitter related to al-Qaeda and ISIS
It is worthy of note that, of the 90 collected and analysed tweets (see Table 3), 71 
contain “context codes”, particularly in terms of location and through hashtags 
to help the search.
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22 Table 3. Findings of content analysis to Twitter – Theme
Theme
@Terror_Monitor @Track_Terrorism @memrijttm Total
Al-Qaeda ISIS Al-Qaeda ISIS Al-Qaeda ISIS
Context codes 20 17 4 9 11 10 71
Communication tools 7 6 1 1 5 11 31
Claim of responsibility for the 
attacks
1 7 1 3 1 1 14
Intimidation and threat of attack 3 - 1 5 2 1 12
Types and effects of war action 4 - 1 - 1 3 9
Public punishment for anti-Islam 
acts
1 7 - - - 8
Preparation of the jihadists 1 4 - 1 1 - 7
Death of jihadists 4 - 1 - 1 - 6
Call to jihad - - 1 - 3 1 5
Executions 2 1 - - - 2 5
Extra-group 2 - 1 - - 2 5
Sequestrations and hostages 2 1 - - 1 - 4
Show of victory 1 1 - 1 - - 3
Medical assistance and jihadists 
recovery
1 - - - 1 - 2
Counterpropaganda - - 2 - - 2
Intra-group - - - - 1 1 2
Audience segmentation - - - - - 2 2
Establishment of the validity of the 
communicator
- - - - - - 0
Justification of violence - - - - - 0
Total 49 44 11 22 28 34 188
Claim4
In 72 of the 90 tweets (see Table 4) was not identified any claim. In the other 
eighteen, the most common type of claim is the “holy war” (six tweets of al-
Qaeda and eight of ISIS), followed by “withdrawal of Western troops from terro-
rist territory” (two tweets referring to al-Qaeda and one to ISIS) and “release of 
terrorists” (one tweet from al-Qaeda).
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Table 4. Findings of content analysis to Twitter – Type of claim
Type of claim
@Terror_Monitor @Track_Terrorism @memrijttm Total
Al-Qaeda ISIS Al-Qaeda ISIS Al-Qaeda ISIS
No claim; 19 16 3 8 11 15 72
Holy war; 1 4 2 3 3 1 14
Withdrawal of Western troops from 
terrorist territory;
- - - - 2 1 3
Release of terrorists; - - - - 1 - 1
Total 20 20 5 11 17 17 90
Rules of Propaganda
The most identified rule of propaganda (see Figure 2) is “strength mood/domi-
nance”, with 28 tweets of al-Qaeda and 38 of ISIS; followed by “dissuasion”, with 
19 tweets of al-Qaeda and 31 of ISIS. In third place for both groups is the rule 
“good causes/incitement/identification” with sixteen tweets of al-Qaeda and 21 
of ISIS. Finally, the “unanimity/contagion” is present in nine tweets of al-Qaeda 
and eighteen of ISIS.
Figure 2. Most expressive rules of propaganda present in Twitter related to al-
Qaeda and ISIS
For a general version of the data related to rules of propaganda, see Table 5.
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24 Table 5. Findings of content analysis to Twitter – Rules of propaganda
Rules of Propaganda
@Terror_Monitor @Track_Terrorism @memrijttm Total
Al-Qaeda ISIS Al-Qaeda ISIS Al-Qaeda ISIS
Bases of 
propaganda
Grain of truth - - - - - - -
Transfusion - - - - - - -
Counter-
propaganda
Scapegoat/
unique enemy
- - - - - - -
Disfigurement - - - - - - -
Perversion/
Dissonance/
Inversion 
- - - - - - -
Style Enlargement/
Convergence of 
contents
- - - - - - -
Anticipation/
Forecast
- - - - 2 - 2
Dissuasion 11 17 3 8 5 6 50
Dualism - - - - - - -
Escalation/
Imitation/Self-
defence
2 4 - 5 1 1 13
Legitimation - - - - - - -
Manichaeism - - - - - - -
Orchestration - - - - - - -
Use of metaphor - - - - - -
Claim - - - - - - -
Sacralisation 1 1 - - - - 2
Simplification - - - - - - -
Strength 
image
Good causes/
Incitement/
Identification
8 10 2 4 6 7 37
Strength mood/
Dominance
13 19 4 8 11 11 66
Exploitation of 
success
- - - - - - -
Unanimity/
Contagion
7 7 - 4 2 7 27
Impossibility of identification - 1 1 2 4 - 8
Total 42 59 10 31 31 32 205
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Type of image
75 of the 90 tweets analysed contain text and at least one iconic image. ISIS tends 
to rely more on this dualistic resource. The other fifteen have text only. Note that 
none of them presents video.
b) YouTube Videos
Theme
The topics identified in al-Qaeda’s videos are: “destruction of cities” and “call 
to fight”. ISIS’s videos highlights: “establishment of the validity of the commu-
nicator” (for example, with personal jihadists experiences), “show of victory”, 
“holy war”, “withdrawal of Western troops from terrorist territory”, “counter-
propaganda”, “intimidation and threat of attack”, “life in Caliphate”. The com-
mon topic in videos of both groups is “context codes”, particularly information 
of location. 
Claim
There is no claim in four of the five videos analysed. In the video “Teaser flames 
of war” is present the claim “withdrawal of Western troops from terrorist terri-
tory” through the image of Barack Obama saying “we will not be returning to 
fight in Iraq”, followed by images of a war scenario composed by explosions and 
U.S. militaries —and one in particular with a gun pointed—.
Rules of Propaganda
The rules of propaganda identified in the two videos of al-Qaeda are “good cau-
ses/incitement/identification”, “scapegoat/unique enemy”, “manichaeism” and 
“transfusion”. ISIS is more eclectic: “good causes/incitement/identification”, 
“scapegoat/unique enemy”, “disfigurement”, “dissuasion”, “exploitation of suc-
cess”, “manichaeism”, “perversion/dissonance/inversion”, “simplification” and 
“transfusion”.
Semiotic Analysis
In the analysis of video Lucas Kinney video propaganda, concretely in the linguistic 
level, the words “Muslim” and “blood” are etymologically deconstructed and 
there are no traces of any poetic resource. “Muslim” is derived from the Persian 
plural of Musliman and the Arabic Muslim. It means “a follower of the religion of 
Islam” (Anon, 2016a). “Blood” derives from the Latin sanguis and means the red 
liquid that is sent around the body by the heart, carries oxygen and important 
substances to organs and tissue, and removes waste products (Anon, 2016b). The 
Arabic adage “blood has flowed, the danger is past” expresses the idea of sacrifice 
(Cirlot, 1971/2002: 29). In this video, Lucas Kinney appears in the middle of a 
destroyed village (and in the middle of the camera frame) that suffered an attack 
by ISIS. Kinney encourages hatred and the fight against ISIS (“and tomorrow if 
you do not stand up this could be your house”). In the iconic-plastic aspect, the 
frame is horizontal and large; the colour that stands out is the moss green of 
Kinney clothing and the angle is normal.
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26 The resource Video showing the aftermath of army attack on refugee camp has 
no perceptible linguistic aspects and exposes the destruction of a camp, na-
mely empty tents and debris strewn across the ground. In the plastic aspect, 
the frame is horizontal and narrow, except for two times when it is large in 
order to show the scale of the damage, the colours that stand out are the 
aquamarine of the logo in the upper left corner and the azure blue of the 
child’s coat hanging up in one of the tents in the middle of the destruction; 
the angle/shot is normal, showing naturally the reality, or high, revealing 
the ruin.
In the video Teaser Flames of War by ISIS, linguistically, it was explored 
the word “flames” —which etymologically derives from the Latin flamma 
meaning “a stream of hot, burning gas from something on fire” (Anon, 
2016c)— and the poetic function of “flames of war” —a metaphor—. This vi-
deo covers the invasion of Iraq by the USA and encourages the fight through 
the words: “fighting has just begun”. In the plastic level, the frame is ho-
rizontal and narrow; the colours that stand out are the orange and the red 
of flames; and the angle is normal, except when it is pointed a gun to the 
enemy who is on the floor —here it is adopted a high-angle shot to show 
superiority over him—.
Linguistically, the video Lend Me Your Hears underlines the words “facts” 
and “truth”. Etymologically, the word “facts” derives from the Latin factum 
and signifies “something that is known to have happened or to exist, espe-
cially something for which proof exists, or about which there is information” 
(Anon, 2016d). “Truth” comes from the Latin veritas, meaning “the real facts 
about a situation, event, or person” (Anon, 2016e). The semantic analysis 
reveals the intention to show the truth, the existence, without constructions 
or manipulations. The poetic function of the following expressions are also 
explored: “lend me your ears” —hyperbole—, “my fate now lies in the hands 
of the Islamic State” —a prosopopoeia— and “show you the truth” —hyper-
bole, if we consider the Platonist maximum that the truth is not perceptible, 
metaphorized in the cave allegory—. John Cantlie says it will be exposed a 
series of programmes/films in which he will “dispel the manipulated truths” 
of the Western media and “show you the truth”. He presents himself as the 
holder of the pure truth vs. the invention. In the plastic level, the frame is 
horizontal/narrow when the aim is injecting emphasis and emotion to the 
John Cantlie’s words on ISIS’s victories; the emphasized colour is the orange 
of the prisoner’s uniform, and the angle is normal.
The video Mujatweet highlights, linguistically, the agglutinative word 
“mujatweet”. The words mujahedin —which means Islamic fundamentalist 
combatant (Anon, 2016f)— and tweet —a publication in the social network 
Twitter— compose the word that entitles the video.
 There are no traces of poetic function. Plastically, the frame is horizon-
tal and narrow; the blue is the protagonist colour, standing present in the 
clothes of both children and ISIS’s fighters who distribute sweets, and the 
sky-blue is observed in the ice cream car. The angle is normal and high when 
the objective is to emphasize children and the idea of protection and pater-
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nalism, and low when a child is in the lap of one mujahedin, in order to show 
his strength and stature.
2) We Are What We Communicate: Comparison of the Digital 
Communication Strategies of Both Groups in Social Networks
Each group has delineated a digital networks strategy, with content and form 
converging to the collecting of the most attractive results of communication and 
persuasion in the target audience: West (by the terror), followers, new recruits, 
apostates, and media agendas. 
Thematically, in the tweets, the two most frequent topics referring to both 
groups are “context codes” —revealing temporal and geographical data— and 
“communication tools” —tweets that advertise the applications to phones of 
each group, their magazines or their propaganda videos—. In the case of al-Qae-
da, violent topics, such as “types and effects of war action”, “death of jihadists” 
and “intimidation and threat of attack” are very salient. The references to ISIS 
are mainly linked to the issues “claim of responsibility for the attacks”, “public 
punishment for anti-Islam acts” and “intimidation and threat of attack”, cons-
tructing a warlike ambience. 
The most outstanding type of claim is “holy war” (six tweets of al-Qaeda 
and eight of ISIS), followed by “withdrawal of Western troops from terrorist 
territory” (two tweets referring to al-Qaeda and one to ISIS), corroborating the 
alliance between religion and war and the desire to expel foreign troops. In 
both groups, the rules of propaganda most evoked are related to strength 
image: “strength mood/dominance”, “good causes/incitement/identification”, 
and “unanimity/contagion”; and style: “dissuasion”. Formally, most tweets 
rely on text with at least one iconic image, tending to a numerical advantage 
of ISIS. Most of the tweets analysed has hashtags with the group abbreviation 
that they referred to and provides context codes, as the localization —both of 
them help the search—. 
YouTube broadcast videos of both groups widely convey counterpropa-
ganda, anchored in the rules “scapegoat/single enemy”, as well as “trans-
fusion” and “manichaeanism”. ISIS’s videos address the “life in Caliphate”, 
while the ones from al-Qaeda show the “destruction of cities” inflicted by 
the forces of ISIS, revealing the hostility also present between the two en-
tities and the use of inter-terrorist groups counterpropaganda. Both groups 
incite to war, through the “call to action”, the “intimidation and threat of 
attack”, the “counterpropaganda” and other topics, such as “holy war” and 
“withdrawal of Western troops from terrorist territory”. The claim, confir-
ming the pattern in Twitter, is weakly present. There is a pattern verified in 
both groups related to the linguistic (e.g. selected and highlighted lexemes, 
figurative language techniques), plastic (e.g. frame, colour, angle) and nar-
rative (e.g. a protagonist who represents the role of the propagandist or the 
source to truth) resources used in the videographic materials. ISIS bets more 
than al-Qaeda, not only in the amount of online videos, but also in its qua-
lity and sophistication.
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28 CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
The results show, and bringing to the discussion the UGT, that the digital media 
play a vital role to terrorism by providing to terrorist groups a platform to spread 
their goals, opinions and claims (Faria, 2007: 161) and a multitude of technolo-
gical tools to produce and diffuse contents and to penetrate the media agendas 
around the world. 
This media dependence is explained by the need of terrorist groups to impact 
public opinion and, hence, to disseminate fear and propagandize their ideology 
(Faria, 2007: 157). 
The terrorist groups no longer limit themselves to traditional media, as they 
have on the internet a fundamental tool that empowers them to transmit messages, 
without any cuts or filtering (Faria, 2007: 157-158). Comparing both groups, ISIS 
uses much more effectively media than al-Qaeda or any other terrorist group that 
operates on the Internet (Aibaili, 2014). Its contents are broadcasted in several 
languages —especially in English— and in multiple formats. For example: a) the 
mujatweets are short videos —30 seconds, ideal for sharing on Twitter— that por-
tray the mujahedin in noble activities (Bonzio, 2014), such as distributing sweets 
for children; or b) long movies, like Flames of War, with an exhaustive editing 
work, which seeks to glorify the deeds of the fighters.
Each terrorist organization defined a digital communication strategy, with 
specific content and form, with the aim of conquering the target audience: West 
(by terror and threat to security and peace), followers, new recruits, apostates, 
and media. 
YouTube broadcast videos are used for counterpropaganda (e.g. “scape-
goat/single enemy”, “transfusion”, and “manichaeanism”), persuasion and 
recruitment and, therefore, aspire to picture “life in Caliphate” (e.g. ISIS), the 
“destruction of cities” by the other/enemy (e.g. al-Qaeda), to launch “threats of 
attacks”, to expose a “show of victory”, to “appeal to the combat” and to “holy 
war” —hence the use of words, like “blood”, “flames”, or phrases, like “show you 
the truth” and “my fate now lies in the hands of the Islamic State”—. The claim 
is slightly present in videos.
Linguistically, some words are purposely accentuated, such “Muslim” and 
“blood” (al-Qaeda’s videos), and “flames”, “facts”, “truth”, and “mujatweet” 
(ISIS’s videos), reflecting the aim of truth, the bloody mean and the dependency 
of digital technology. The use of poetic function (e.g. hyperbole) helps to the 
constructing of a persuasive message. In the plastic dimension, frames, colours, 
and angles are useful significants in the conceiving of meanings. Both groups 
use a concrete witness/propagandist to assume the role of convincing and in-
citing to fight (Kinney in al-Qaeda’s video) and of clarifying and demystifying 
the appearances (Cantlie in ISIS’s video). It is evident the similarity between the 
both groups to incite to war, to have a counterpropaganda practice, and to use 
identical means (e.g. selected and emphasized words, stylistic resources, plastic 
significants, a person who assumes the role of the propagandist). 
Compiling differences between the two organizations, al-Qaeda publishes vi-
deo, with animosity content towards ISIS (inter-terrorist groups counterpropa-
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ganda). And ISIS corroborates a trend of being a more quantitative and qualitati-
vely partisan, comparatively to al-Qaeda, on communication materials.
Twitter is already used as the main communication and propaganda tool for 
both groups, since it enables to launch threats, to challenge claims to the ene-
my, to vaunt their own actions (Bonzio, 2014). The thematic and propagandistic 
analyses of tweets and the principal claim evoked in Twitter and in one video 
(“holy war”) confirm this potential.
Thematically, there is a coincidence related to both organizations on the most 
expressive issues: in all the three profiles the “context codes” (36 on ISIS; 35 on 
al-Qaeda) and “communication tools” (18 on ISIS; 13 on al-Qaeda). On al-Qaeda, 
three issues, each one with six tweets, followed the referred two most accentua-
ted: “types and effects of war action” (referring to attacks, destruction and fire 
to buildings, victims of attacks, mass executions, suicide bombers, destruction 
of churches and monuments), “death of jihadists” and “intimidation and threat 
of attack”. About ISIS, the issues more emphasized, following the first two, are: 
a) “claim of responsibility for the attacks” (eleven tweets), b) “public punishment 
for anti-Islam acts” (for reasons, such as homosexuality, alcohol and drug con-
sumption, insults to Allah, and apostasy) (seven tweets), and c) “intimidation 
and threat of attack” (six tweets).
Referring to both groups, the most highlighted rules of propaganda are re-
lated to strength image: “strength mood/dominance” (38 tweets on ISIS; 28 on 
al-Qaeda), “good causes/incitement/identification” (21 on ISIS; 16 on al-Qaeda), 
and “unanimity/contagion” (18 on ISIS; 9 on al-Qaeda); and style: “dissuasion” 
(31 on ISIS; 19 on al-Qaeda). 
Terrorist groups are committed to maintaining a strength image through di-
rect or indirect use of security threat and glorification and vanity of their own 
triumphs. Additionally, the two most emphatic issues in Twitter, “context codes” 
and “communication tools”, suggest respectively temporal and spatial referents 
and the practical utility of devices and means (e.g. magazines, apps to phones) to 
communicators and followers.
The visual accentuation is patent in videos and in tweets that tend to be 
accompanied at least with one iconic image. It is a practice notorious in ISIS’s 
performance. This communicative-visual strategy reveals familiarity with the 
concepts of the visual culture, which is a field of study that seeks to understand 
the visual aspects as a cultural transmission source. 
To the traditional battlefield, joins the digital media battle in the strategy of 
terrorists. So, lifting the veil: the threat or the promise “the fighting has just be-
gun” (ISIS’s movie) involves unavoidably a communication strategy and, thus, a 
digital media fate, which requires public, political and academic attention.
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Notes
1 This term is used in this article as a natural 
extension of terrorism, that takes advantage of 
the “huge dependence” that the actual society 
reveals on the new technologies, specially the 
Internet (e.g. Lima, 2006: 40). In the present 
case, the terrorist groups that construct their 
digital strategies aiming to conquest planned 
objectives, such as to spread ideology, to recruit 
new members, to terrorize the West. 
2 Propaganda, in the most neutral sense, 
means to spread or promote particular ideas. 
In Latin signifies “spread” or “seed” (Jowett 
and O’Donnell, 1999: 2).
3 A communication strategy is a well-
planned series of actions aimed at achie-
ving certain objectives through the use of 
communication methods, techniques and 
approaches (Mefalopulos and Kamlongera, 
2004: 8).
4 It was considered “claim” the demand 
for something or the act of admitting respon-
sibility for certain comportment.
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